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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A LEGISLATIVE
STATE: THE SOUTH CAROLINA
EXPERIENCE
JAMES L. UNDERWOOD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The political folk wisdom of South Carolina identifies it as a
legislative state, one in which the general assembly's influence
permeates every aspect of government. Judicial review, a doctrine by which a court, in the context of a narrowly defined adversary proceeding known as a case or controversy, can declare
the actions of the legislative and executive branches to be invalid because they contravene the state or federal constitutions,
would seem to be a strange procedure to coexist with a tradition
of legislative dominance. Surprisingly, both doctrines have been
prominent features of the South Carolina constitutional terrain
throughout much of its colonial and state history. What is even
more remarkable is that the doctrine of judicial review had its
primitive South Carolina beginnings, and had reached a significant degree of development, long before its mature flowering in
the federal system in Marbury v. Madison.1 What made possible
the initiation and development of this doctrine, which would
seem to be almost the antithesis of legislative dominance, on a
schedule that was roughly contemporaneous with the growth of
legislative power? Under what circumstances is judicial review
an effective countervailing force to legislative and executive
abuse of power? When is its potency likely to be diluted by political events?
* Thurmond Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B.,

1959, Emory University; J.D., 1962, Emory University; LL.M., 1966, Yale University.
This article was adapted by permission of the University of South Carolina Press from
the author's forthcoming book THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUMuE I. THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, ExEcUTIVE, AND JUDicIAL BRANcHEs. Preparation of

this book was sponsored by the South Carolina Legal History Collection of the University of South Carolina.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Several factors combined to make judicial review a logical,
though not inevitable, addition to the persistent strains of South
Carolina politics.
First, unlike Great Britain (which had a constitution composed of a mixture of evolving parliamentary and monarchical
tradition, common law, and a scattering of basic documents,
such as the English Bill of Rights and Magna Charta) the colonial governments, virtually from the start, operated under limitations provided by written documents. These documents were
Royal charters, Proprietary or Royal instructions to the Governors, and English laws. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison,2 a frequent, if not inevitable, concomitant of
having documents that purport to be superior laws, is the
growth of a class of individuals, usually judges, who interpret the
superior law and determine whether or not other forms of law
are compatible with it. In addition, the colonial legislatures, despite their frequent claims that they were the legitimate inheritors of the powers and traditions of the British Parliament, were
clearly subordinate legislative bodies, operating within the ambit
permitted by English law. That Royal instructions and English
laws were being used by South Carolina courts as early as 1724
as the basis for striking down legislation is evidenced by complaints lodged by the Commons House against the judges with
regard to their decision in the case of Dymes v. Ness.3 A committee of Commons asserted that "the whole Government is arraigned [by the judges in Dymes v. Ness] for passing Laws as 'tis
suggested contrary to '4the Kings Instructions & Repugnant to
the Laws of England."

Second, the core concept of judicial review is that there is a
higher law against which the validity of legislation should be

2. Id. at 177-78.
3. A. SALLEY, JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.- NOVEMBER 15,
1726-MARCH 11, 1726/7 47 (1946). See also McGovney, The British Origin of Judicial

Review of Legislation, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1944).
4. A. SALLEY, supra note 3, at 70 (emphasis added). See also McGovney, supra note
3, at 10-11. For an example of a South Carolina colonial court striking down a provincial
criminal statute because it contravened an act of the British Parliament and was, thus,
beyond the scope of power that the King could legitimately delegate to the local legislature, see Rex. v. Mellichamp, The S.C. Gazette, May 1-8, 1736, at 1, col. 1 (Charlestowne)(available on microfilm at South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S.C.). For a useful discussion of the case, see Cook, JudicialReview and Legislative Power, in SOUTH
CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY 83, 86-89 (H. Johnson ed. 1980).
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measured. This concept was given greater intellectual force because it melded easily with the political philosophies that fueled
the colonials' arguments in other disputes in eighteenth century
America. Natural law theorists, such as John Locke, developed
doctrines holding that governments were formed by social contract between the people and the government to the end that
government could protect the people in their lives, liberties, and
estates, to which Locke gave the collective term "property." If
governments in general, and legislatures in particular, were unfaithful to their task of protecting the property of the people,
then they could be resisted.
The ultimate form of resistance was revolution. Thus, the
thoughts of natural law philosophers such as Locke were used to
justify revolution against King and Parliament because they allegedly had changed the focus of government from protecting
the property of the people to self-serving tyranny. The basic
concept that the acts of legislators and executives can be measured against a higher natural law, which defines the basic ends
of government and renders invalid governmental acts that exceed those limits, can be used to justify two forms of resistance
to the extreme and persistent abuse of power: the ultimate form,
revolution, and the less disruptive, more stabilizing forms, such
as court suits that strike down legislative and executive acts exceeding the power of those officials as circumscribed by the
proper ends of government established by natural law and the
5
social contracts.
A third, more textually rooted, supporting beam for judicial
review was found in basic English civil liberties documents such
as Magna Charta, which were eventually used to protect the
rights of the people against encroachments by any branch of the
government. This approach provided a precedent for the use of
similar provisions in state and federal constitutions, such as the

5. J. LocKE, SECOND TRATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 226, at 188 (1690). See also
McGovney, supra note 3, at 6-7 (crediting Locke with establishing a natural law doctrine
that could readily be adapted to serve as the basis of judicial review). McGovney asserts
that it was Lord Coke who harnessed the somewhat ethereal natural law theories to the
mundane task of providing an understandable, workable basis for judging the validity of
executive and legislative acts in litigation. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
646, 652 (K.B. 1610). This case was cited by counsel in an early South Carolina case,
Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 96 (1789), as the basis for arguing that legislation
can be voided if it is contrary to common right, reason, and Magna Charta.
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Bill of Rights, as the basis for striking down statutes and executive acts that jeopardized the rights of the people.
IL. THE COLONIAL BEGINNINGS

Thus, courts in eighteenth century South Carolina had
three forms of superior law against which legislative acts could
be measured. The first type included Colonial charters, Royal
instructions to Crown officials, and English laws. These documents naturally played a less important role in judicial review
during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods than
they had earlier. The second form was composed of natural law
theories, which asserted that, either by virtue of a social contract
between the government and the people or by virtue of an innate pattern in the way the universe and society are organized,
there is a higher law by which enactments of government must
be evaluated. The third type of superior law consisted of basic
documents of English liberty, such as Magna Charta, and their
latter day American counterparts in state and federal
constitutions.
An analysis of several early South Carolina cases assessing
the validity of legislation will demonstrate how these strands
were woven together to form the fabric of judicial review. Judicial review has served to retard the expansion of legislative
power in two major respects. First, it has limited legislative encroachment on the domain of the other branches of government
and acted as a brake on usurpation by those branches of legislative prerogatives. Second, it has shielded the rights of the people
from legislative and executive actions that would invade those
rights.
In Dymes v. Ness6 we find one of the earliest examples of
judicial review not only in South Carolina, but in America at
large. As noted above, this 1724 case prompted a reposte from
the Commons House that complained about the use of the instructions of the King and English law as the basis for striking
down legislation.7 In that case Royal instructions and English
law were used as the bases for an exercise of the first form of
6. A. SALLEY, supra note 3, at 47; see also McGovney, supra note 3, at 49.
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; A. SALLEY, supra note 3, at 70; see also
McGovney, supra note 3, at 10-11.
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judicial review: curbing legislative power because it allegedly
trespassed on the prerogatives of another branch-in that case,
the court system itself.
Legislation had been passed setting a rule of court under
which those claiming that they lived beyond the jurisdiction of a
court which had asserted power over them could raise that issue
in a variety of ways, including a formal motion or an informal
suggestion made without assistance of counsel. In Dymes the
general court in Charleston refused to follow the statute and
ruled that these issues could be raised only by pleading specially
to the jurisdiction, a highly technical procedure that would presumably require the assistance of counsel. The clear implication
of the case was that the legislation was unconstitutional as a
usurpation of the right of the judiciary to govern the technicalities of its own proceedings. What was implicit in the opinion became explicit following a series of exchanges between the judges
and Commons: the Commons House passed a resolution that
criticized the decision as violating the statute, and the judges
asserted that they had the power to strike down legislation that
was contrary to English law or Royal instructions."
Early examples of the second form of judicial review, the
protection of civil rights against governmental abuse, were based
firmly on appeals to natural law, common reason, traditional
law, and Magna Charta as loftier forms of law by which others
must be gauged.
Ham v. M'Claws9 concerned the protection of a civil right
that would not be recognized in modern times: a property right
in a slave. A family had moved from Honduras to South Carolina and brought slaves with them. The importation of slaves
into South Carolina under such circumstances was at that time
prohibited by statute, and state revenue officers sought to seize
the slaves. The court noted that since the statutory change forbidding the importation was of recent origin and could not have
been known by the slave owners, it would be arbitrary and capricious to permit the state to confiscate the slaves. A law permitting such forfeiture of property rights would, thus, be invalid.
While asserting the right to strike down such a law, the court

8. McGovney, supra note 3, at 10-11; see also A.

SALLEY,

supra note 3, at 46-47, 65,

70.
9. 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 93 (1789).
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chose not to exacerbate the relationship between the judicial
and legislative branches and held that the legislature did not intend the statute to operate in such an unjust manner. Thus,
while firmly underlining its authority to judicially review the validity of legislative enactments, the court exercised that power in
a manner that avoided striking down the law. The fact that the
impact of the decision on the legislature was so benign made judicial review easier to accept. A precedent was established, however, for use in future cases in which the result would be less
favorable to the legislature.
The court based its judicial review authority firmly on common reason and natural law, concepts that would later be used
by South Carolina courts to strike down legislation. The court
noted:
It is clear, that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void, as far as they are calculated to operate
against those principles. In the present instance, we have an

act before us, which, were the strict letter of it applied to the
case of the present claimants, would be evidently against common reason. But we would not do the legislature who passed
this act, so much injustice, as to sit here and say that it was
their intention to make a forfeiture of property brought in here
as this was. We are, therefore, bound to give such a construction to this enacting clause of the act of 1788, as will be consistent with justice, and the dictates of natural reason, though
contrary to the strict letter of the law; and this construction is,
that the legislature never had it in their contemplation to make
a forfeiture of the negroes in question, and subject the parties
to so heavy a penalty for bringing slaves into the state, under
the circumstances and for the purposes, the claimants have
proved.10
Not only did Ham v. M'Claws affirm the right of courts to
appraise the bona fides of a statute according to common or natural reason, synonyms for Lockean natural lav, but it also established the principle that the potent weapon of judicial review
should not be used indiscriminately or in a way that creates
strained relations between branches that must cooperate in order for a tripartite system to work. Thus, when possible, a stat10. Id. at 98 (some emphasis added).
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ute should be so construed as to uphold its validity.
Building on the techniques pioneered in Ham v. M'Claws,
the court in Bowman v. Middleton11 again acted to protect property rights by invoking the aid of natural law, common reason,
and Magna Charta. In Bowman, however, the court was unable
to interpret the statute under review in a manner that would
rehabilitate it and, as a result, struck down a law that divested
one group of freeholders of their property and lodged it in
others. The members of the court declared that they
were clearly of the opinion, that the plaintiffs could claim no
title under the act in question, as it was against common right,
as well as against magna charta, to take away the freehold of
one man and vest it in another, and that, too, to the prejudice
of third persons, without any compensation, or even a trial by
the jury of the country, to determine the right in question.
That the act was, therefore, ipso facto, void.12
The emphasis upon natural law and the traditional common-law rights of Englishmen as measuring rods for evaluating
the propriety of government acts reached its height in Zylstra v.
Corporationof Charleston.3 In this instance the government action declared void was not a state-wide statute, but a judgment
of the Court of Wardens of Charleston.
The plaintiff in Zylstra brought an action in a higher court
to prevent the court of wardens from enforcing a fine it had levied against him. The reviewing court agreed with his contention
that the fine was illegal. The court rooted its decision partly on a
statutory basis, concluding that the court of wardens had levied
a fine in an amount beyond its statutory authority. The major
thrust of the decision, however, was that the lower court's actions had contravened a still higher law by levying the fine without a jury trial. The court noted:
[T]he trial by jury is a common law right; not the creature of
the constitution, but originating in time immemorial; it is the
inheritance of every individual citizen, the title to which commenced long before the political existence of this society; and
which has been held and used inviolate by our ancestors, in

11. 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 252 (1792).

12. Id. at 254 (some emphasis added).
13. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (1794).
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succession, from that period to our own time; having never
been departed from, except in the instances before mentioned.
This right, then, is as much out of the reach of any law as the
property of the citizen; and the legislature has no more authority to take it away, than14it has to resume a grant of land which
has been held for ages.
This decision planted the seeds for a judicial review power
of remarkable fertility. The vision of the Zylstra court was that
there were rights that antedated the constitution and existed independently of it. These were inherited rights of the English
speaking peoples, their origins lost in the primeval mists of England. The opinion implies that there is a law superior to the constitution, which is, in most theories of judicial review, considered
to be the supreme law. 15 This is a highly subjective approach to
judicial review-one that would permit an activist judge to create rights out of his own version of history and natural law.
Judicial review in South Carolina has not developed such
breathtaking scope. Dymes v. Ness, however, with its emphasis
on written, fundamental documents as a basis for assessing the
legitimacy of legislation, and the subsequent decisions in Ham v.
M'Claws, Bowman v. Middleton, and Zylstra v. Corporationof
Charleston,with their emphasis on natural law, Magna Charta,
and the traditional rights of Englishmen, did furnish an adequate foundation for a more measured growth of judicial review.
Judicial review is often perceived as an anomaly within a
democracy: an alien elitist practice engrafted on popular government. Why should a small group of specialists, who in the federal government and many states are not directly elected by the
people, be able to overturn actions of those who, by virtue of
having been elected, can more directly express the will of the
people? It may be even more difficult to justify when the state
constitution explicitly provides that "[a]ll political power is
vested in and derived from the people only. . . ." Should the
will of the people be frustrated by a small group manipulating
highly technical rules?
To create a climate favorable to the use of judicial review as
a balance wheel for government, a theory must be developed

14. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
15. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
16. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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that reconciles that practice with democracy and with the tripartite form of government of which the judiciary is only one
branch, a branch not intended to dominate the others. In South
Carolina jurisprudence, this rapprochement between judicial review and democracy is achieved through a theory that the sovereign will of the people expresses itself in three complementary
forms. First, the members of the legislature as individuals represent the will of the people within their particular districts.
Second, they represent, collectively, the will of the people on a
state-wide basis, but this will is expressed from the unique vantage point of the coming together of legislators who were selected not by a state-wide electorate, but by voters in particular
districts. Third, the Governor and other executive officers chosen by a state-wide electorate presumably represent the will of
the people in the most comprehensive sense.
These are elementary concepts familiar to nearly everyone
who has been exposed to a grade school civics course. What is
more surprising, however, is that the courts, although judges are
not popularly elected, are also considered to manifest the sovereign will of the people. Thus, when a court strikes down legislation or an executive act as unconstitutional, it does not, in theory, stymie the will of the people, but actually effectuates it.
This seeming riddle can be understood only if it is realized that,
in a judicial review context, the will of the people is not their
immediate will expressed at the most recent election, but rather
their long-term will embodied in a document of superior law, the
constitution, a document designed to provide stability to government that might otherwise change form, chameleon-like, with
every shift in public mood.
One of the earliest South Carolina historians, Dr. Ramsey,
summarized this theory in his 1809 description of the role of the
courts in South Carolina, when he stated:
South Carolina in the formation of courts of justice in
other particulars, has generally copied after the models of corresponding courts in England; but with this difference, the
state considered her courts as the courts of the people in their
sovereign capacity, enforcing justice between separate units of
one common mass of sovereignty.1 7
17. D.

RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, FROM ITS FIRST SITTEMENT IN

1670, TO THE YEAR 1808, at 129 (1809)(emphasis added).
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The courts have used similar language in defending judicial review as the embodiment, rather than the negation, of the will of
the people. One opinion that most trenchantly expressed this
point is Wood v. Wood.18 In that case the supreme court struck
down one of the so-called "stay laws," which postponed the time
at which a creditor could enforce his contractual rights against
the debtor in court. These laws were passed to afford debtors
relief in the times of general financial distress during and after
the Civil War. The court struck down these laws as violative of
the constitutional provisions forbidding governmental impairment of contractual obligations. 19 In its opinion, the court outlined the theory that judicial review is not the usurpation by one
branch of the authority of another nor a nullification of the will
of the people, but an expression of the people's will a embodied
in more permanent form in the constitution. The court stated:
The prohibition of any legislation which "impairs the obligation of contracts" is, therefore, when occurring in the Federal
as well as in the State Constitution, one of those restraints to
which the people of the State have voluntarily subjected

themselves, and not one imposed on them by either the legislative or judicial department of their government. Such restraints it is presumed, were assented to in the fundamental
law, because they were believed to be, in the general result,
most conducive to the true interests of the whole people as a
political community; they constitute the only peaceful security
of the minority-of the weaker and less self-asserting interests-against the violence of those social convulsions occasionally generated by the action of political or commercial forces,
which for a time confound the perceptions of right and wrong,
and by the urgency of instant pressure tempt the majority to
the adoption of unwise and unjust measures of relief ....

But

whatever may have been the grounds and reasons for their introduction into the Constitution, so long as they continue to be
there, they are expressions of the sovereign will in the most

solemn form such expression puts on, and every one engaged in
the administration of the Government
is under the highest
20
possible obligation to maintain them.

18. 48 S.C.L. (14 Rich.) 148 (1867).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; S.C. CONST. of 1790 art. IX, § 2. Impairment of
contractual obligations is currently prohibited by S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4.
20. 48 S.C.L. (14 Rich.) at 150-51 (emphasis added).
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Under such doctrines it was theoretically possible for a
strong tradition of judicial review to exist within the milieu of a
legislatively dominated government. The legislature's enactments and the court's assessment of the constitutional validity
of those laws are merely two different manifestations of the sovereign will of the people. The statutes represent the short-term
electorally expressed will, and the constitution, as interpreted by
the courts, represents the fundamental, more permanent will.
This theory made it possible for judicial review to survive within
the context of a democratic, legislatively dominated state. Nonetheless, claims that the constitution is the more basic, long-lasting, and, thus, superior expression of popular sovereignty and
that the courts are the chosen interpretors of it have remained
controversial throughout South Carolina history.
In addition to the development of theories that facilitated
the coexistence of judicial review with a legislative-style democracy by dubbing the court's constitutional decisions as expressions of sovereign will, the survival of judicial review beyond the
embryonic stage was greatly aided by the circumstances under
which it was born. Judicial review is more palatable if it is introduced in a form that does not threaten the dominant element in
the government of the time. Once established, it can later be
used against that element.
The earliest traces of judicial review in South Carolina are
found during the time when South Carolina was still a proprietary colony. During that time, judicial review apparently was
used to bolster the position of the already powerful proprietors
against the Commons. Naturally, the proprietors did not complain about this addition to their arsenal of weapons against a
rambunctious Commons. Commons complained, but the precedent of judicial review had been planted. While no evidence of
the precise contents of the cases involved has survived, the controversy is documented by a set of grievances compiled by the
commons house in 1693. The ninth grievance complained:
That Inferior Courts taking upon themselves to try, adjudge & determine the power of Assemblys, or the validity of
acts made by them, or of such matters and things as are acted
by, or relating to the House of Commons, all which (we humbly
conceived,) is only inquireable into and determinable by the

Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
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next Succeeding General Assembly. 21

South Carolina historian Edward McCrady described the
impact of the incident in the following manner:
So it appears that at this early day the courts of Carolina
were assuming to pass upon the constitutionality of laws. They
were, it is true, now doing so in the interest of the Proprietors
as against that of the people; but whatever its present purpose

and inspiration, it was an important step taken, though unconsciously, in the direction of liberty, when courts began to inquire into the authority of the laws themselves. Because, however its immediate purpose was to condemn the assembly. .. ,
the people at that time failed to recognize the
advantage which
22
would accrue to them by such a precedent.
Thus, a number of factors favorable to the establishment
and survival of judicial review combined to foster a growing tradition of vigorous court appraisal of the legitimacy of the acts of
the other branches. The following factors can be identified: (1)
the existence of written documents, such as Royal charters and
instructions, British statutes, and Magna Charta, that formed
the ingredients of a superior law by which the validity of other
laws could be gauged; (2) the popularity of natural law theories
that contributed yet another component to the higher law that
served as a measuring rod for other laws; (3) the development of
a theory that made judicial review compatible with a legislatively dominated democracy by asserting that court constitutional decisions were not antithetical to the sovereign will of the
people, but were instead an expression of the long-term wishes
and interests of the citizenry; and (4) the introduction of judicial
review during the time of the Lords Proprietor under circumstances that made it acceptable to the dominant element of the
government.
While these doctrines and events may have made judicial
review possible, they did not ensure its tranquil existence. Pow21. W. RIvERs, A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO THE CLOSE OF THE
PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENT BY THE REVOLUTION OF 1719, at 434 (1856); E. McCRADY, THE
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA UNDER THE PROPRIETARY GovERNmAENT 1670-1719, at 242
(1897). See also The Constitution of South Carolina, lecture by S. J. Simpson, Esq., to
South Carolina College, 96-97 (May 7, 1904) (available at South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, S.C.).
22. E. McCRADY, supra note 21, at 244 (footnote omitted).
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erful voices were raised against it. In 1798 Governor Charles
Pinckney, in a letter to the president and members of the state
senate, criticized judicial review as being "new in its principle"
in its consequences to the Rights of
and potentially "destructive
' 23
the Legislature.

III. HISTORICAL

CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF

JUDICLL REVIEW

At times judicial review has led a shaky and uncertain existence. The successful use of judicial review as an instrument to
curb alleged abuses of power by other branches has proven to be
most vulnerable to direct attack or manipulation in several
situations.
First, court decisions striking down the actions of other
branches are most likely to be resisted by those branches, and
reprisals against the judiciary taken, if the judgments threaten
the economic well-being of large segments of the population or
of power interests. Second, court decisions invalidating legislative or executive actions often are difficult to enforce when they
deal with visceral moral issues and the branch upon which the
court decision weighs most heavily has the will and popular support to resist. Third, legislative or executive recalcitrance to
judgments that their actions have been unconstitutional is most
likely to be successful when those branches possess control over
the wherewithal that the judiciary needs to survive or function
efficiently. Fourth, resistance to judicial review is more likely to
be successful if the intractable parties can appeal to a powerful
outside force-one that is not part of the state government and,
thus, not subject to state court judicial review. Finally, when the
23. Letter from Governor Charles Pinckney to President and Gentlemen of the Senate (Nov. 28, 1798)(available at S.C. Archives, Columbia, S.C., Microfilm Governor's
Messages, No. 721, frame 614, Roll No. 5). A view similar to that of Governor Pinckney
was urged by Chief Justice Michie in Williams v. Watson, when he stated:
For if this Court has a Power of Judging wither [sic] the Laws which the
General Assembly make are Void, or not, they have a Power Superior to the
General Assembly, But this is a power which I conceive this Court has not.
Judges in England are the proper Expositors of Acts of Parliament when
they are made, But I don't remember that they ever Questioned the power of
making Laws.
Records of the Provincial Court of Common Pleas, Journal, 1754-63, at 226, 237
(1759)(available at South Carolina Archives, Columbia, S.C.).
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voice of judicial review is splintered and fragmented because of
disagreement among courts and judges, it may prove to be ineffective. An examination of historical examples will illustrate the
weak fissures in the structure of judicial review.
One of the most notorious examples of legislative revenge
against an offending court system that dared to strike down a
statute for unconstitutionality occurred in the wake of the famous "Test Oath Case," State ex rel. M'Cready v. Hunt.24 That

decision was perceived as posing a threat, albeit a somewhat indirect one, to the economic well-being of the entire state, as well
as an affront to the dignity of the legislature.
During the late 1820s and early 1830s, the South, while not
economically dead, was certainly among the walking wounded as
a result of protective tariffs passed by the national Congress.
The economic brunt of these measures fell on the South because
it was a largely agricultural region that imported a great variety
of manufactured goods from abroad. The tariffs made these imports expensive in order to foster New England manufacturing.
The southerners viewed the measures as taking money from
their pockets to put it in those of New England mill owners.
To counter these tariffs, as well as other, earlier offenses of
the federal government, southern political leaders, such as John
C. Calhoun, espoused the "nullification doctrine" or its variant
the "interposition doctrine." Under these theories, a state could
defend itself and its people against what it regarded as unconstitutional or injurious federal government actions by nullifying
them or interposing itself between those acts and its people so
that they would be neutralized. As part of their implementation
of the nullification doctrine, political leaders in South Carolina,
first in a convention resolution and later in a statute, promulgated a "Test Oath" whereby South Carolina Militia officers
were to swear primary allegiance to South Carolina rather than
to the federal union. One officer refused to take the oath and
asked in a court suit that his colonel be directed to deliver his
commission anyway because the oath requirement was
unconstitutional.
The state court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, agreed,
holding that the Test Oath provisions violated article IV of the
24. 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1 (1834).
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state constitution 25 and article VI, clause 3 of the federal constitution.26 Since the state constitutional provision already stipulated the oath to be taken by state officers, the legislature could
not replace it with another. Both the constitutionally prescribed
state oath and the federal constitutional provision required state
officials to swear to uphold the federal constitution. Thus, higher
law in both the state and federal constitutions rendered the Test
Oath invalid.
Whether or not a military officer took the prescribed Test
Oath did not pose a direct economic threat. The M'Cready decision, however, became a symbol around which all the emotions
of the tariff controversy gathered. The decision seemed to be the
final straw, frustrating the state's defense against what it regarded as economic warfare. The M'Cready case, together with
other occasions on which the court seemed to vindicate federal
over state authority, prompted the legislature to retaliate. The
South Carolina Court of Appeals was abolished in 1835 and was
not reestablished until 1859. The offending judges were reas27
signed to other courts of equity and law.
Thus, the combination of a controversial decision, which became a symbol of a severe threat to the South Carolina economy,
and the control the legislature had over the very existence of the
court of appeals resulted in a repudiation of judicial review. It is
difficult to envision such a repudiation occurring today. The supreme court, the modern equivalent of the 1835 court of appeals,

25. This article provided:
All Persons who shall be chosen or appointed to any office of profit or
trust, before entering on the execution thereof shall take the following oath: "I
do swear, or affirm, that I am duly qualified, according to the Constitution of
this State, to exercise the office to which I have been appointed, and will to the
best of my abilities discharge the duties thereof, and preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of this State, and of the United States."
S.C. CONST. of 1790 art. IV. A virtually identical oath is currently required of all "Members of the General Assembly, and all officers" by S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
26. This clause provides in part:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. ...
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

27. See Senese, Building the Pyramid: The Growth and Development of the State
Court System in Antebellum South Carolina, 1800-1860, 24 S.C.L. REv. 357, 366-69
(1972); see also D. WALLACE, SOUTH CAROLINA, A SHORT HISTORY 405-07 (1951).
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is firmly rooted in the state constitution and not subject to statutory abolition. 28 Furthermore, the constitution grants to the
chief justice, as head of the unified judicial system, the power to
assign judges to particular courts, thus eliminating the opportunity for legislative control over the assignment process, which
could be used to retaliate against judges for unpopular decisions.
Of course, the legislature still controls the election and reelec29
tion of judges.
Another series of cases demonstrating that judicial review is
often the prisoner, rather than the master, of powerful economic
convulsions occurred during the immediate post-Civil War period. Because of the massive economic dislocations caused by the
war, many otherwise credit-worthy people were unable to pay
their debts. To avoid innumerable economic failures, the legislature passed a series of "stay laws" that postponed the enforcement of contract debts, either by delaying the effectuation of
court judgments by sheriffs or by staying, until later sessions,
the time during which the courts could consider actions ex contractu. The judicial review fervor of the courts matched the creativity of the Governor and legislature, point by point. Each succeeding new stay law technique was greeted by a court decision
that it violated the constitutional provisions prohibiting government actions that impaired contractual obligations.
Governments have some flexibility in varying the means by
which contracts already entered into may be enforced, if such
legislation is part of general law and achieves judicial reform.
When, however, the laws are intended to and do cripple the basic ability of the creditor to enforce the debt, the statutory provision is constitutionally infirm. A significant delay in enforcement may constitute such an impairment.30
The court's impairment of contract decisions must have appeared to the other branches of government and the general
population to have an "Alice in Wonderland" quality. The economic world was lying in ruins, but the court insisted on following traditional rules of debtor and creditor rights, whether or not

28. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1.

29. S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 13.
30. See Wood v. Wood, 48 S.C.L. (14 Rich.) 148 (1867); State v. Carew, 47 S.C.L. (13
Rich.) 498 (1866)(cases interpreting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. 9, §
2, and S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. 9, § 2).
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they conformed to reality. To the court it must have seemed
that no economy could survive unless creditors had reasonable
expectations of stable laws upon which they could base their decisions to lend money. To win the conflict, the executive and legislative branches appealed to an authority beyond the reach of
the judicial review power of the South Carolina court system-General Sickles, the federal military commander for South
Carolina. During this time of Presidential Reconstruction,
United States Army officers often held the pivotal elements of
power.
Sickles issued a military fiat that suspended enforcement of
judgments obtained between 1860 and 1865; prohibited imprisonment for debt; stopped procedures for the recovery of money
on the basis of contracts for the purchase of slaves; halted foreclosure proceedings for twelve months; and created a homestead
exemption for debtors. In a letter to Sickles, Governor Orr
wrote: "But for your General Order No. 10, I believe an increase
of troops would have been necessary to guard the public records
and insure the1 safety of sheriffs and other officials against popular violence.

3

Thus, the pressure of economic turmoil resulted in the circumvention of the force of judicial review by appeal to a higher
authority, one beyond the reach of South Carolina court edicts.
Rather than successfully curbing the unconstitutional excesses
of other branches, the courts had merely added their voices to
the cacophony of those attempting to deal with the economic
problems confronting the state.
Judicial review functions most effectively when the courts,
as a branch not possessing its own coterie of soldiers or police to
enforce its orders, can rely upon the aid of the other branches to
effectuate their decisions. When the assistance of the other segments of the tripartite government is not available, either because of the active resistance of the other branches to constitutional decisions or confusion over who legitimately holds power
in those branches, court decisions have a less decisive impact.
The potency of judicial review may be further reduced if the judiciary does not present a united front to those whom they seek
to guide by their decisions.

D.

31. F. SIMKINS & R. WOODY, SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 47 (1932); 3
240 (1934).

WALLACE, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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All of these features served to dilute the force of judicial
review in the famous Reconstruction era dual government controversy. In that dispute, the South Carolina courts sought to
resolve a set of Byzantine issues revolving around two rival
groups claiming to be the legitimate South Carolina House of
Representatives and two men staking claims to the Governor's
office. The difficulty that normally accompanies attempts by the
judiciary to resolve disputes in which the hopes of powerful and
ambitious men may be frustrated was compounded by a
splintering of views between the state and federal judiciary and
by fragmented views within the state judiciary itself. A further
complicating factor was the presence of federal troops, which
tended to encourage one side of the dispute to refuse to acquiesce to state court decisions. A comprehensive account of these
events would be beyond the scope of this article, but a brief
description of the key elements of judicial review in the controversy is in order.
South Carolina court attempts to prevent the Republican
dominated state Board of Canvassers from exceeding their
merely ministerial vote tabulating functions by resolving election disputes in favor of Republicans and against Democrats
were frustrated by a contrary federal court decision. The state
courts had ordered the Board members imprisoned for contempt
when they exceeded limitations those courts had placed on their
functions. A federal district judge ordered them released on two
grounds. First, he concluded that the proper functions of the
Board were not merely ministerial, but also included discretionary duties that were of an executive nature and beyond judicial
control. Second, since the federal election for President and
Congress was conducted simultaneously with the state vote, the
judge concluded that the Board was performing federal as well
as state functions and held that the former were not subject to
state control. The federal judge ruled, therefore, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, that the Board members should be dis32
charged from imprisonment.

The judiciary also failed to present a united position in the

32. See Case of Electoral College, 8 F. Cas. 427 (C.C.S.C. 1876)(No. 4336). Quite
apart from which court was right in its view of the proper role of the Board, the judiciary
presented a confusing babel of voices that led the parties to seek other sources for a
solution. See F. SIhnuNS & R. WooDy, supra note 31, at 514-37.
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gubernatorial phase of the dispute. Wade Hampton, the Democratic favorite of the southern power structure that hoped for a
restoration of its political influence after the Reconstruction
years in the wilderness, had eked out a narrow win over the Republican incumbent, D.H. Chamberlain, a Harvard trained lawyer from Massachusetts. Both Chamberlain and Hampton declared themselves winners. This hotly contested dispute was
inextricably intertwined with an equally rancorous controversy
over who composed the legitimate South Carolina House of Representatives because under the 1868 state constitution, contested
elections for governor were to be decided by the general
assembly."3
A Democratic group that had elected William H. Wallace as
speaker claimed to be the duly constituted house. Their assertions were challenged by a Republican dominated group that
chose E. W. M. Mackey speaker. The Mackey house announced
that Chamberlain was Governor, while the Wallace house predictably chose Hampton. Both these issues-which was the legitimate house of representatives and who was the valid claimant to the governorship-were contested in the courts. In
Wallace v. Hayne and Mackey, 4 the supreme court concluded
that the Wallace group composed the true house of representatives and that the court had authority to order the Republican
secretary of state to perform certain ministerial duties connected
with the transmission of election returns. The court did not,
however, rule on whether or not he was the appropriate object
for the order in the confused situation then existing. Eventually,
both Hampton and Chamberlain were sworn in by their respective supporters, and both began to discharge the gubernatorial
functions.
The ultimate determination of who was the true incumbent
of the governorship came in a series of cases probing the legitimacy of pardons issued by Hampton and Chamberlain. The first
case, Ex Parte Norris,35 concerned the legality of a Hampton
pardon. The second, Ex Parte Smith,38 addressed Chamberlain's
authority to grant a pardon.

33. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 4.
34. 8 S.C. 367 (1876).
35. 8 S.C. 408 (1877).
36. 8 S.C. 495 (1877).
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The supreme court's decision in Norris was characterized by
unseemly backing and filling and a confusing proliferation of
opinions. Initially, with only two of the three justices sitting because of the illness of the chief justice, the court held that
Hampton was the true incumbent and that his pardon was,
therefore, effective. Clarity was soon replaced by confusion,
when Justice Wright reversed course and held that Chamberlain
was the legitimate Governor. The state then had one justice,
Willard, for Hampton and one, Wright, for Chamberlain. The
magisterial voice of judicial review was replaced by the judicial
equivalent of a barnyard brawl. It is no wonder that the decision
contributed little to the solution of the controversy.
The Smith case, concerning the propriety of a Chamberlain
pardon, arose after the resignation of Justice Wright. This time
the court, again with only two justices sitting, spoke with greater
unity and clarity. Both justices, Willard and McIver, held that
Hampton was the Governor and that the Chamberlain pardon,
therefore, carried no weight. This opinion added much needed
legal respectability to Hampton's hold on the office of Governor.
The Smith opinion, however, did not prove decisive in
resolving the imbroglio. While confusion engendered by the earlier Norris decision still lingered, it was the continued presence
of federal troops as a prop to Chamberlain's claims that actually
kept the controversy alive. The troop withdrawal was finally
brought about through political rather than legal channels. President Hayes conducted interviews with both Hampton and
Chamberlain and as a result, although himself a Republican,
withdrew the federal troops whose presence had lent an artificial
glow of legitimacy to Chamberlain's pretentions to the governorship. Only after this withdrawal did Hampton enjoy undisputed
tenure as Governor.
Even though the message voiced by judicial review was
sometimes confused and uncertain, the courts did on occasion,
especially in Ex Parte Smith, inject a note of stability and reason, and the flavor of enduring principles, into a dispute that
was otherwise characterized by political and even physical power
plays. Judicial review failed to be decisive, even on issues that
were largely legal, not only because the judiciary spoke with a
fragmented voice, but also because in the dual government dispute, as in the stay law controversy, a powerful force outside the
scope of state judicial review-federal troops-discouraged one
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side to the dispute from yielding to legal solutions. Since the
habit of settling constitutional disputes by force rather than litigation had taken root during the Civil War and Reconstruction
eras, it was perhaps too much to expect judicial review to exercise a decisive influence.
The effectiveness of judicial review as a means of policing
the constitutional propriety of the acts of the other branches can
be seriously diluted when the judiciary is confronted by the
combination of the following factors: (1) a case that requires a
decision in an area affecting visceral moral issues that deeply divide the community; (2) a decision that must be rendered during
a time of major, watershed changes in the political system; (3)
strong opposition by elements in the other branches to the
course taken by the judiciary; and (4) the availability to those
branches of means for manipulating the composition of the judiciary and the timing of the consideration of the case. These circumstances coalesced during the Tillman era in the late nineteenth century when the state was deeply divided over the
question of whether and how liquor should be sold within the
state.
The so-called "Dispensary controversy" arose out of an attempt to effect a compromise in the rancorous dispute between
the temperance proponents, who sought to ban all liquor sales
within the state, and the open saloon forces. 7 The compromise
pushed by Governor Ben Tillman ultimately spawned new forms
of bitterness-over the enforcement tactics used to implement the
compromise. Tillman favored, and lobbied through the legislature, a law that created a state monopoly over liquor sales,
which were all to be made through a state Dispensary. The law
neither abolished the sale of liquor, as had been sought by temperance advocates, nor permitted private enterprise saloons to
sell liquor freely to all comers. Rather, the statute recognized the
reality that liquor would inevitably be bought and consumed,
but attempted to regulate that use by controlling who purchased
the liquor and how much they obtained.
Liquor consumption issues inevitably engender highly
charged emotional disputes in Bible Belt states. The explosiveness of the controversy was enhanced by rumors that heavy
37. For a description of the Dispensary dispute, see F. Sim~iNs, THE TmLmAN MoVEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA 185-202 (1926), D. WALLACE, supra note 27, at 624-29 (1951).
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handed enforcement techniques would be used. Rumors quickly
spread that household searches would be conducted to root out
illicit purchases of liquor not sold through the Dispensary.
These stories of privacy invading tactics touched off a storm of
protest, including rioting. The disorder was compounded when
the urban dominated militia balked at enforcing the act and
Tillman recruited his own ad hoc rural militia. "Wets" were set
against "drys," town against city, pro-Dispensary forces against
anti-Dispensary forces. Into this maelstrom entered the court
system.
A circuit judge prohibited the Darlington County Board
from operating a Dispensary. A newly seated Tilmanite member
of the supreme court stayed the circuit court order. This decision was superseded when the supreme court, by a vote of two
anti-Tillman judges to one Tillmanite judge, declared the Dispensary law unconstitutional because it created a state-run
monopoly. 38

According to the pristine theory of judicial review, the other
branches, even though they might disagree with and even resent
a court decision, should at least acquiesce in it. The Tillman era,
however, was an unusual time.39
Tillman had been swept into office on a wave of popular fervor that, in its uglier manifestations, sought the elimination of
black political influence.40 Even during the Dispensary controversy, the galvanic force of his movement was hard to stop. After
effectively marshalling his popular and legislative support and
obtaining passage of a new Dispensary law, Tillman set out to
manipulate the judicial review process to his own advantage.
Justice McGowan, an anti-Tillman judge who had voted to
declare the Dispensary unconstitutional, came up for reelection.
Tillman managed to engineer his defeat and his replacement by
E.B. Gary, who was more sympathetic to Tillman's policies. To
complete the coup, Tillman managed to postpone consideration
of the new Dispensary Act's constitutionality until after Mc38. See McCullough v. Brown, 41 S.C. 220, 19 S.E. 458 (1894).
39. See F. SIMKINS, PTCHFORD BEN TILLMAN, SouTH CAROLINIAN (1944); F. SMKINS,
supra note 37.
40. See F. SIMKINS, supra note 37, at 203-28 (discussing how this was carried out by
adoption of a new constitution with highly restrictive franchise provisions).
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Gowan's term had expired and he had been replaced by Gary.4 '
Tillman struck at the Achilles heel of judicial review in
South Carolina: the reelection process. Before the adoption of
the 1868 Constitution, 42 judges enjoyed the security of tenure
during good behavior. Since then, however, both supreme court
justices and circuit judges have been required to submit themselves periodically to the legislature for reelection. Although opponents may be nominated freely at these elections,43 the potency of judicial review as a brake upon unconstitutional
executive and legislative acts has been maintained; judges who
have served competently have been reelected, even though they
may have authored controversial opinions."

41. See F. SIMKiNs, supra note 37, at 196-97; F. SasxNS, PITCHFORK BEN TILLMAN,
SOUTH CAROLINiAN 257-59 (1944); D. WALLACE, supra note 27, at 626.
42. Compare S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 13 with S.C. CONST. of 1865, art.

Il, § 1.
43. Currently, under the terms of S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 9, 13, supreme court justices and circuit judges serve for ten- and six-year terms, respectively.
44. Traditionally, reelection of judges by the house and senate have been short and
unopposed affairs. See 1984 S.C. SEN. J. 1717; 1982 S.C. SEN. J. 1514; 1980 S.C. SEN. J.
282-83; 1978 S.C. SEN. J. 263-64; 1976 S.C. SEN. J. 671-72; 1974 S.C. SEN. J. 81; 1972 S.C.
SEN. J. 46-47; 1970 S.C. SEN. J. 84; 1968 S.C. SEN. J. 31-32; 1966 S.C. SEN. J. 71-76; 1964
S.C. SEN. J. 73-74. A brief dispute over the reelection of an associate justice did occur
during a time of dissension between the court and legislature over a decision invalidating
the election of sitting legislators to court of appeals judgeships. See State ex rel. Riley v.
Martin, 274 S.C. 106, 117, 262 S.E.2d 404, 409 (1980). In McLeod v. Yonce, 274 S.C. 81,
261 S.E.2d 303 (1979), a statute directing the chief justice to appoint circuit court judges
to preside over utility rate cases was held unconstitutional. See The State, Jan. 1, 1980,
at C1, col. 1. That controversy soon abated, however, and the judge was unanimously
reelected. See 1980 S.C. SENATE J. 282-83.
With the exception of times of political upheaval such as the Tillman era, judges at
both the supreme court and circuit court levels usually have been routinely reelected. A
survey of the tenure of supreme court and circuit court judges over a 20 year period,
from 1964 to 1984, examined the records in the South Carolina Legislative Manual and
produced a number of instructive findings.
First, circuit court judges serve an average of 10 to 15 years on the bench, with 20
years not being uncommon. In fact, within that 20 year period only 3 circuit court judges
left the bench under an apparent political cloud. See The State, May 10, 1973, at Al, col.
1; The State, Jan. 4, 1980, at C1, col. 2; The State, April 16, 1982, at A16, col. 1.
Second, supreme court justices demonstrate a remarkable continuity in office that
transcends periods of extreme strife between the high court and the legislature. The consistent reelection of justices continued even during the 1980s, when a vigorous dispute
between the legislative and judicial branches was taking place concerning the power to
make rules of court. See 1982 S.C. SEN. J. 1914; 1980 S.C. SEN. J. 282-83.
Finally, the survey indicated that when both supreme court and circuit court judges
do in fact retire from the bench, the primary reasons are advancing age and failing
health rather than a "Tillmanesque" manipulation of the reelection process to satisfy
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Because of the strong tradition of legislative dominance that
long has been the most salient characteristic of South Carolina
government, many of the major tests of the efficacy of judicial
review have involved court attempts to curb legislation that
breached constitutional limitations. Yet some of the most difficult challenges confronted by South Carolina courts in exercising their judicial review functions have arisen when they were
asked to delineate the proper boundaries of executive power. In
this area the South Carolina courts have followed a familiar, if
difficult to apply, path blazed many years ago by the United
States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.45
In Marbury the Supreme Court reasoned that federal courts
could issue orders to members of the executive branch, even at
the highest levels, under the following guidelines. First, when
the official's duties are merely ministerial responsibilities, which
he has no choice under law but to carry out, a court order directing him to perform those duties is more appropriate than if
he is granted broad discretion under the law to determine
whether it is wise to perform the act.
Second, when the official's responsibilities are rooted in
statutory law, rather than constitutional provisions, and those
statutes concretely specify his duty, an order is more likely to be
appropriate than if his power is of constitutional origin and is
expressed in terms subject to a variety of interpretations. If the
question is a "political" one, expressly committed by the Constitution to an elected official, and depends for its proper execution
upon insight into the popular will, it is inappropriate for the
courts to interfere except when necessary to protect vital
rights.46
Third, when the primary impact of executive action is to
injure personal civil liberties, such as rights of free expression,
property, or due process, the courts have greater incentive to indominant political forces. Judges are most vulnerable during times of major shifts of
political power from one ruling class to another, such as the 1876 return of the native
white population to office. Democratic party ascension to power resulted in the ouster,
on an election procedure technicality, of most judges elected by Republicans. See 3 D.
WALLACE, supra note 31, at 326 (1934).
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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terfere with executive functions by the issuance of an order. In
mixed circumstances, when a case concerns the exercise of a constitutionally granted executive function over which an official
enjoys wide discretion and the exercise of that function injures
vital personal liberties, the court must apply a balancing test:
The harm to the vigor and efficiency of the executive function
that would accompany issuance of the order must be weighed
against the degree of harm to civil liberties that would occur
without the order.
Finally, an order directed at an executive official may be legitimate if it is necessary to produce information or other vital
materials necessary for the judicial or legislative branches to
function. Separation of powers does not mean that each branch
operates in a watertight compartment. The recalcitrance of one
branch cannot be permitted to impede the functions of another.
If compliance with an order by an executive official would help
another branch discharge a pivotal function, but would also result in damage to the executive agency's performance of its own
responsibilities, then a weighing process must again be
undertaken.

47

South Carolina courts have developed a similar formulation.
In State ex rel. Wallace v. Hayne and Mackey, 8 in the midst of
the dual government controversy, the court addressed the question of whether the secretary of state should be subject to an
order that directed him to deliver election results to one of the
two rival groups claiming to be the true house of representatives
so that that body could discharge its constitutional function of
determining who was the legitimate winner in the gubernatorial
election. The court concluded that it had the authority to issue
the order because the duty to deliver the returns to the proper
house of representatives was a ministerial one, imposed by laws
granting the secretary of state no discretionary decisionmaking
power. Thus, the order would not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The exact language of the court is worth quoting at
length because it enunciated principles frequently followed by

47. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Black v. Sheraton Corp. of
Am., 237 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also R. BERGER, EXEcuTIVE PRVIMEGF- A CONSTrrUTIONAL MYTH 228 (1974); J. UNDERWOOD, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL
DIscOVERY RULES 70-83 (2d ed. 1985).
48. 8 S.C. 367 (1876).
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South Carolina courts in later years. The court declared:
Then it is alleged that this Court has not jurisdiction over
H. E. Hayne, one of the executive officers of the state, because,
according to the limitations of the Constitution, the powers of
the government are vested in three distinct bodies, neither one
of which can exercise any control over another. That may be
conceded to the fullest extent, and yet what would become of
the rights of the citizen, vested in him not only by the common
law but by the statutes, if there was no control over the executive department of the government? The Treasurer is a part of
the executive department, and yet more than one case may be
found where this Court has interposed to compel him to perform duties specially required of him by law. And so of the
other officers. It is not an encroachment upon the duties of
their particular departments. This Court does not undertake to
say to them that "we are to perform the duties assigned by law
to you." It does no more than say you must perform the specific duties assigned to you by law where you have not the privilege of exercising discretion, that is all. The mandamus could
not compel the Governor to issue a pardon to a man; that
would be an encroachment on his prerogative. But to say that
the judicial department of the government, where a citizen
avers that his right has been infringed upon by an executive
officer, could not interfere, as, for example, when the Legislature had appropriated a certain sum of money to be paid to
him, and the Treasurer refuses, is startling. Where would the
judiciary be? Where would the other departments be? The judiciary would sink into mere insignificance. The other departments might increase in bulk and wield their powers to such an
extent that the whole liberties of the people might be entirely
49
destroyed.
The head of a branch of government can remain separate
and independent only so long as he can exercise managerial control over the lower officials and employees who must carry out
his policies. Thus, one of the most persistent problems in walking the tightrope of judicial review of executive actions is maintaining the proper balance between meddlesome interference
with another branch's personnel affairs and abdication of a responsibility to see that constitutional limitations on executive

49. Id. at 375-76. See also Foster v. Taylor, 210 S.C. 324, 42 S.E.2d 531 (1947)(use of
mandamus to compel county to pay judge's salary).
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power over personnel matters are not breached.
Achieving this is an especially difficult task in South Carolina, a state that anomolously grants "supreme executive authority" to the governor,5 0 but simultaneously permits the existence
of a variety of executive agencies, many of which are independent or quasi-independent of the governor's discretion. Application of the Marbury-Wallace standards to gubernatorial personnel actions, especially the removal of officials, requires careful
scrutiny of the facts of each case to determine the degree of discretionary control that statutory or constitutional law grants the
Governor over the official in question.
The basic guidelines for conducting a judicial examination
of gubernatorial removal of key personnel were set in State ex
rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel.5 1 In that case the court had under consideration the Governor's removal of members of the Dispensary
Board. The ousted officials claimed that they had been removed
by the Governor in violation of their due process rights because
they had received only a summary hearing at which evidence
had been illegally admitted. They further alleged that they had
been given insufficient opportunity to confront witnesses against
them. The deposed officials sought a writ of certiorari for review
of their firing.
The court used the occasion to discuss the use of a variety
of writs, especially mandamus, against the executive department
in personnel matters. The court concluded that no writ could
issue against the Governor in the instant case because he had
acted well within the scope of his statutory and constitutional
authority.
Writs of mandamus may be issued only when the official is
under a statutory or constitutional duty that he has no choice
but to perform and the nature, scope, and steps of that duty are
clearly delineated. Because the constitution and augmenting
statutory laws give the Governor great responsibility, if not always power to match it, and his duties touch so many interacting facets of governmental activities, it is especially difficult to
determine which of his duties are ministerial and which are discretionary. Duty is mixed with duty in a fashion difficult to separate. Thus, the issuance of writs of mandamus directed at the

50. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
51. 76 S.C. 395, 57 S.E. 185 (1907).
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Governor is seldom appropriate.
No writ of any variety could be appropriately issued in the
Ansel case because statutes had given the Governor sweeping removal power over members of the Dispensary Board in an effort
to clean up the corruption prone agency. Under the statutory
authority granted him, he was not required to conduct any hearing at all, much less one of a plenary, trial nature. The Board
members were political appointees, who assumed their positions
with the knowledge that they were subject to the Governor's
summary dismissal rights. Thus, they could not reasonably have
expected to obtain property rights in their positions. All of these
factors, together with the inherent need of the Governor, as
chief law enforcement officer, for power to discipline state officials who were not acting in accordance with the law, made an
order interfering with his prerogatives highly inappropriate.
When the Governor is not acting under a constitutional
grant of independent power, but rather under statutory power
that he is directed to share with the legislature, and he attempts
to appropriate the entire power to himself, the courts may issue
the appropriate orders to restrain this abuse of power. The authority of the courts to issue such directives to the executive is
especially clear when gubernatorial action injures personal liberties of the ousted officials or the prerogatives of other branches.
One of the most dramatic examples of the effective use of
judicial review power under such circumstances occurred in a series of cases arising out of a long, bitter struggle between Governor Olin Johnston and the South Carolina Highway Commission
in the mid-1930s. 5 2 Chief Highway Commissioner Ben Sawyer
and his colleagues wished to pursue a vigorous policy of paved
highway construction to replace the narrow, rutted roads with
modern transportation facilities. Johnston, an ardent populist,
considered this too rich a diet to be pursued by a poor state in
the midst of the depression. He especially opposed an expensive
set of bonds that the Commission wanted issued to pay for the
construction. He also wanted to make motoring less an elitist
privilege and more a pastime available to all. After promising

52. See Dacus v. Johnston, 180 S.C. 329, 185 S.E. 491 (1936); Hearon v. Calus, 178
S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935), Heyward v. Long, 178 S.C. 351, 183 S.E. 145 (1935). See
generally J. Huss, SENATOR FOR THE SOUTH, A BIOGRAPHY OF OLIN D. JOHNSTON 64-72
(1961).
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the electorate that they would soon be able to get automobile
license tags for only three dollars, he became frustrated when
the Commission did not share his enthusiasm for this project.
He then attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the recalcitrant
Commissioners removed and replaced by his own nominees.
The senate, which had advice and consent authority over
his appointees, was uncooperative. Unwilling to endure the elaborate for-cause hearing procedure that was a prerequisite for removal, Johnston decided to take more direct action. Under his
direction, armed elements of the National Guard seized Highway Commission offices and erected machine guns and guard
posts in the hallways. He then ejected the incumbent Commissioners and installed his own men. His agents took possession of
the Highway Commission bank accounts and blocked the attempts by the sitting Commissioners to perform their duties. He
justified these actions by complaining that corruption was rife
throughout the department and that funds were being used for
unauthorized purposes. When the Commissioners resisted his attempts to correct these problems, he declared them to be in insurrection against the lawfully constituted government. They
had, he claimed, formed a rump faction government of their
own.
The incumbent Commissioners responded with a series of
court actions that sought to prevent the Governor and his agents
from interfering with the exercise of their offices and from exercising any control over Commission funds.5 3 The court con-

cluded that the Governor's power to declare an insurrection was
a broad constitutionally rooted power requiring expertise different from that of a court. Thus, the Governor's edict that a state
of insurrection existed could not be questioned in court. The
techniques used to enforce that declaration, however, could be
subject to judicial orders curbing gubernatorial abuses of power
that encroached upon the authority of other branches and upon
civil liberties. Since the Governor was required by statute to
conduct hearings prior to removing Commissioners and had not
done so, he had interfered with the Commissioner's reasonable
expectations that they would be able to continue in their positions and perform their jobs.M
53. See cases cited supra note 53.
54. Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 397-415, 183 S.E. 13, 19-27 (1935).
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In terms of modern day due process rights, Governor Johnston had interfered with their property rights in their jobs. Unlike the members of the Dispensary Board in Ansel, who had
accepted their jobs with knowledge of the Governor's right to
summarily oust them, these officials could reasonably have expected to continue as Commissioners unless the appropriate
charges were brought and hearings conducted. The court's explanation was not quite so elaborate, or cast in such contemporary terminology, but that, in essence, was its holding with regard to gubernatorial interference with personal rights.
The governor had also trespassed on the domain of the legislative branch by appropriating to himself appointive power
that ought to have been shared with the senate in its advice and
consent capacity. The court concluded that unless it could control such power usurpations by the Governor, the doctrines of
separation of powers and personal civil liberties would fall prey
to the caprice and whim of the Governor. 5
These were not cases in which court authority to conduct
judicial review was based on the need to direct an executive to
perform clearly and narrowly defined ministerial duties that he
was obligated to carry out. Nor were these cases in which the
executive had discharged such duties, but had deviated from the
specified manner in which they were to be performed. These
were cases in which the Governor, although acting in areas in
which he enjoyed some discretion, had leaped far beyond the
outer boundaries of his authority and transgressed the personal
rights of the Commissioners and the prerogatives of another
branch.
The broad legislative backing found for the Governor's action in Ansel was absent. Unlike the stay law and dual government controversies, judicial review was effective during the
Highway Commission disputes not only because the Governor
had clearly overstepped the bounds of his authority when he
used military might in a situation where there had been no outbreak of violence, but also because the judiciary presented a relatively united front, while the political branches were fragmented. Many legislators opposed Johnston's actions, and he
55. Dacus v. Johnston, 180 S.C. 329, 338, 185 S.E. 491, 495 (1936); Hearon v. Calus,
178 S.C. 381, 399-400, 183 S.E. 13, 20-21 (1935); Heyward v. Long 178 S.C. 351, 376-79,
183 S.E. 145, 156-57 (1935).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss2/5

30

Underwood: Judicial Review
in a Legislative
State: The South Carolina Experi
JUDICIAL
REvimw
1986]

had few allies. He did attempt to appeal to a higher authority,
beyond the scope of judicial review: he went to the people in the
next election and demanded a pro-Johnston, anti-Commission
legislature. Although he met with some initial success in the
elections for the houie of representatives, his plans for marshalling popular and legislative support behind his position went
awry when an opponent, Sol Blatt, was elected speaker of the
house.58
V.

SECURITY OF POSITION AND SALARY: A PREDICATE FOR

EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL

REvIEw

In order for judicial review to succeed in curbing abuses of
power committed by branches of the government with more coercive resources and, often, a wider public following, the courts
must operate from a position of security. Disastrous consequences to the stature of judicial review may quickly follow decisions invalidating legislative and executive action if those
branches can respond with effective retaliatory measures, such
as the abolition of the offending court that occurred in State ex.
rel. M'Cready v. Hunt, 7 the "Test Oath Case."
Article V, section 16 of the state constitution is a key provision designed to insure the independence of the judiciary. This
section prohibits the salaries of judges from being diminished
during the terms for which they were elected. In the absence of
such a measure, a tacit threat of financial revenge, which could
be made real, might hover over the judiciary whenever it evaluated the constitutionality of acts of other branches involved in
the budget process. Fertile occasions for such threats might occur during times of economic difficulty. When states become economically strapped and want to retrench all around, cases may
arise asking the judiciary to rule on economic emergency measures, which often go to the outer limits of constitutional power.
It is the possibility of the use of financial weapons to encroach
upon judicial independence that makes the decision of Grimball
v. Beattie5" so important in securing the integrity of judicial
review.

56. See J. Huss, supra note 53, at 64-72.
57. 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1 (1834); see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
58. 174 S.C. 422, 177 S.E. 668 (1934).
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In the midst of the depression of the 1930s, South Carolina
was attempting to follow Spartan fiscal policies to avoid
overcommitment in a time of scarce money. As part of these retrenchment measures, the legislature declined to appropriate
money for the full salaries of the judiciary. Although there is no
evidence in the opinion that the salary reduction was any form
of retaliation for unpopular decisions, it was a clear violation of
the constitutional guarantee that there be no reduction of
judges' salaries during the term for which they were elected.
Judges instituted suit against the state treasurer and comptroller and sought an order directing those officials to pay full salaries to the judges. All of the supreme court justices disqualified
themselves as interested parties, and a special court of distinguished lawyers was appointed by the Governor to hear the
case. 59
The special court concluded that the salary reduction violated not only the explicit provisions of article V, section 9 (now
article V, section 16), but also the more general separation of
powers doctrine because it threatened the independence of the
judiciary. The court noted that the state judges must not only
resolve conflicts between private individuals, but also between
the various branches of government regarding their proper
spheres of power and between government agencies and individuals concerning alleged encroachments upon civil rights. If the
judges could be manipulated by any party to such disputes, the
entire system would crumble. An independent judiciary was the
balance wheel of society.
An order to the state treasurer and comptroller to grant the
judges their full salaries was issued. The court regarded this as
merely a directive to perform ministerial duties that did not
trespass in any manner on the discretionary functions of those
officers. The appropriations acts in force at the time the sitting
judges took office, together with the constitutional measures outlawing judicial salary reductions effective during judges' term of
office, combined to create a self-executing spending statute. The
special judges were not creating a new fiscal policy; they were
merely ordering compliance with one already in place. This

59. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. V, § 6. Disqualification of justices and appointment of
special judges is currently authorized by S.C. CONST. art. V, § 19 and S.C. CODE ANN. §§
14-1-130, 14-3-130 (1976).
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posed no real difficulty for the executive officers since, despite
the economic hard times, a surplus existed in the treasury. Perhaps the Grimball opinion gave the judiciary a strong enough
sense of security to enable it to issue controversial constitutional
rulings in the tumultuous atmosphere of the Highway Commission dispute.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, no structure of rules can insure the
success of judicial review as a restraint on unconstitutional
abuse of government power unless that instrument is used cautiously and with restraint. The political world would not long
tolerate a small, nonpopularly elected group of specialists who
promiscuously interfered with the functions of other branches
and arrogated to themselves broad policy making power. Thus,
as the supreme court noted in Crow v. McAlpine,"0
This Court has repeatedly held that all reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act. If
a constitutional construction of a statute is possible, that construction should be followed in lieu of an unconstitutional
construction."1
If the court must use restraint in deciding whether or not to
strike down statutes, the end product of the legislative process,
it must be especially cautious in interfering with the inner working of the legislative and executive branches before their deliberative processes are complete and some injurious action has resulted. Each branch must be given leeway to correct its own
mistakes before judicial interference occurs.62

60. 277 S.C. 240, 285 S.E.2d 355 (1981).
61. Id. at 242, 285 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting Casey v. South Carolina State Hous.
Auth., 264 S.C. 303, 312-13, 215 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1975)).
62. Chester County Hosp. and Nursing Center v. Martin, 281 S.C. 25, 314 S.E.2d
308 (1984).
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